

A NOVEL APPROACH FOR GENERATING SMALL 8×8 -BIT S_4 S-BOXES

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In this manuscript, we present 8×8 -bit S_4 S-boxes of order 16 by using the action of symmetric group S_4 on the LSB's of the S-box generated from subgroup of Galois field. The inspiration is the improved performance parameters and the practical applications of existing S_8 S-boxes around Cryptography. The S_8 S-boxes use the permutations of symmetric group S_8 on the elements of the Galois field $GF(2^8)$. Whereas, in the proposed S_4 S-boxes, the symmetric group S_4 acts on the LSB's of the elements of the subgroup of Galois field. Consequently, $4!$ new S_4 S-boxes have been attained. The fact that the elements of these S-boxes are different from those of the subgroup produces ambiguity about the algebraic complexity of the new S-boxes. The obtained S-boxes have been inspected and equated with the original S-box by balance property, nonlinearity test, linear approximation probability test, differential approximation probability test and strict avalanche criteria. The aptness of the S-boxes to encryption applications has been determined and verified with majority logic criterion.

Keywords: S-box on subgroup of Galois field, symmetric group S_4 , balance property, nonlinearity test, linear approximation probability test, differential approximation probability test, strict avalanche criteria, majority logic criterion

1. Introduction

The Cryptography is one of the most significant mechanisms used in the field of information security. Encryption algorithms in Cryptography play an important role in ensuring the security of information. With the widely use of digital products and the evolution of attacks, the research and development of more information security techniques with high efficiency and reliability are demanded.

The encryption process in cryptographic algorithms is supplemented with a nonlinear component capable of creating confusion in the cipher text. The design of this nonlinear component, called substitution box or S-box, is of great interest to cryptanalysts because the understanding of its functionality yields insight into the encryption process and its characteristics.

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S-box is an elementary component of symmetric key algorithms which performs substitution. In block ciphers, it is typically used to vague the relationship between the key and the cipher text [17]. In general, an $m \times n$ S-box takes m number of input bits and transforms them into n number of output bits, where m is not necessarily equal to n . The primary cryptographic properties required by strong S-boxes are balance, nonlinearity, strict avalanche criteria and least linear and differential approximation probabilities etc. Different cryptographic applications require different acceptable measures of these and other properties.

The advanced encryption standard S-Box was unambiguously designed to be vigorous to linear and differential cryptanalysis by minimizing the correlation between linear transformations of input/output bits [6]. In the development of symmetric cryptosystems, a significant portion of the time spent on design or analysis is centered on the substitution boxes of the algorithm. The study of the design properties and construction methodology of Rijndael S-box played an important role in the analysis of its behavior [7, 12]. In literature, almost all S-boxes are generally synthesized over finite Galois fields [1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 18, 19 etc.]. Though, Shah et al. has set up an erection technique of S-boxes through the multiplicative cyclic subgroup G_s of group of units of the Galois rings [16]. In [15], the authors presented a novel construction scheme of S-boxes based on the elements of subgroups of multiplicative groups of units of the commutative finite chain rings of type $\frac{F_2[u]}{(u^k)}$, where $2 \leq k \leq 8$. Later, we shifted the structure to the subgroup of multiplicative group of Galois field and the S-boxes are constructed on the elements subgroup of order 15 adjoining zero. In the continuation of this study, we will perform the action of symmetric group of permutations on the S-box and will go to the analysis of its behavior.

Rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2, the algebraic expression of S-box on subgroup of Galois field is presented. In section 3, we will explain construction mechanism of new S-boxes. Section 4 gives the analyses of these S-boxes. Conclusions are presented in section 5.

2. Algebraic expression of S-box on subgroup of Galois field

In our earlier research, an S-box has been constructed based on the elements of the subgroup of the multiplicative group (say H) of finite Galois field. The structure of this S-box can be represented by the following equation:

$$S(x) = p \circ q(x) \quad (1)$$

In this expression, p represents the inversion function and q denotes the affine function of certain kind, defined on the subgroup of Galois field $GF(2^n)$. The construction with this method yields robust algebraic complexity and keeps

desirable cryptographic characteristics. The elements of the S-box on subgroup of Galois field $GF(2^8)$, constructed by (1), and the corresponding inverse S-box is given in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. In the later study, we will name the S-box on subgroup of Galois field as S-box (1) or small 8×8 S-box.

Table 1

Small 8×8 S-box				
LSB's	0	1	2	3
0	152	79	153	146
1	11	0	147	214
2	78	10	68	221
3	215	69	1	220

Table 2

Inverse S-box				
LSB's	0	1	2	3
0	69	78	147	214
1	10	221	215	220
2	0	146	153	68
3	79	11	152	1

3. Construction of 8×8 -bit S_4 S-boxes of Order 16

The application of S_n permutation on the existing elements of an S-box in $GF(2^n)$ creates $n!$ distinct S_n S-boxes in $GF(2^n)$. The mathematical representation of the S_n transformation process is given as,

$$f : S_n \times S\text{-box} \rightarrow S_n S\text{-box} \quad (2)$$

If $S_8 = \{\pi_i : i = 1, 2, 3, \dots, 8!\}$, then according to the above transformation, $8!$ new S_8 S-boxes can be obtained from S-box (1) with the following procedure,

$$\pi_i(S\text{-box}(1)) = S_8 S\text{-box}_i \quad (3)$$

Example: An example of the small S_8 S-box obtained by applying the permutation $(8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3, 2, 1) \in S_8$ on the elements of S-box (1) is given in Table 3. The main characteristic of the S-box in Table 1 due to which the both transformations in (4) are possible is that the elements of the S-box owns distinct LSB's.

Table 3

An example of small S_8 S-box				
LSB's	0	1	2	3
0	0	162	187	59
1	235	73	242	201
2	34	107	153	80
3	114	25	128	208

But in Table 3, the action of permutation of S_8 on S-box (1) abolishes this property. Thus, second part of the transformation cannot be completed. The comprehensive procedure will be enlightened in the succeeding section.

$$x \in GF(2^8) \xrightarrow{S\text{-box}} y \in GF(2^8) \xrightarrow{S\text{-box}} x \in GF(2^8) \quad (4)$$

This matter has been fixed by the application of S_4 permutation on the LSB's of the elements of the S-box on subgroup of Galois field and $4!$ new distinct 8×8 -bit S_4 S-boxes have been obtained. The mathematical representation of the S_4 transformation process is given as,

$$g: S_4 \times LSBs \text{ of } S\text{-box} \rightarrow S_4 \text{ S-box} \quad (5)$$

If $S_4 = \{\sigma_j : j = 1, 2, 3, \dots, 4!\}$, then according to the transformation (5), $4!$ New $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-boxes are obtained from S-box (1) with the following procedure,

$$\sigma_j (LSBs \text{ of } S\text{-box}(1)) = 8 \times 8 \text{-bit } S_4 \text{ S-box}_j \quad (6)$$

Example: An example of the $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box obtained by the action of permutation $(4,3,2,1) \in S_4$ on the LSB's of the elements of S-box (1) is given in Table 4 and the corresponding inverse S-box is specified in Table 5.

Table 4

An example of $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box				
LSB's	0	1	2	3
0	145	79	153	148
1	13	0	156	214
2	71	5	66	219
3	222	74	8	211

Table 5

Inverse $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box				
LSB's	0	1	2	3
0	69	0	10	79
1	147	153	215	152
2	78	146	221	11
3	214	68	220	1

4. Analysis of new S-boxes

This segment has been devoted for calculating and equating the algebraic complexity of the new S-boxes and the original S-box by computing the results for balance property, nonlinearity test, linear approximation probability test, differential approximation probability test, strict avalanche criteria and majority logic criterion.

4.1 Balance property

S-boxes are Boolean mappings from $\{0,1\}^p \rightarrow \{0,1\}^q$ and there are p component functions each being a map from $\{0,1\}^p \rightarrow \{0,1\}$. A Boolean map of m bits is said to be balanced if its output yields the value 1 with probability $1/2$ over its input set [2]. Balanced Boolean mappings are mostly practiced in cryptography. If a map is not balanced, it will have a statistical bias, making it subject to cryptanalysis such as the correlation attack. The S-box arranged in Table 4 is a set of 8 Boolean vectors of size 16 . The truth tables of these vectors, say $f_0, f_1, f_2, \dots, f_7: H \cup \{0\} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$, are given in Table 6. Except f_5 all the vectors are balanced. The balancedness of some of the Boolean vectors of S-boxes diverts to imbalance when they are constructed on algebraic substructures. But more are the number of balanced Boolean vectors, the more robust will be the S-box. Note that, the S-box on subgroup of Galois field also holds seven balanced and one non-balanced Boolean function.

Table 6

Truth table of Boolean vectors

x	$f_7(x)$	$f_6(x)$	$f_5(x)$	$f_4(x)$	$f_3(x)$	$f_2(x)$	$f_1(x)$	$f_0(x)$
0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
152	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
78	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
10	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
153	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
214	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0
68	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	1
147	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
79	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	1
146	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1
215	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	0
220	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0
221	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0
69	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
11	1	1	0	1	1	0	1	1
1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1

4.2 Nonlinearity Test

The security of cryptographic transformations depends on the nonlinearity of substitutions. The nonlinearity of:

$f \in \{B_n | B_n \text{ is a Boolean function with } n \text{ variables}\}$ is the minimum distance between f and the set of all affine functions A_n [4]. i.e.,

$$NL(f) = \min_{h \in A_n} d(f, h) \quad (7)$$

Or equivalently, it is half the number of bits in the Boolean function, less the largest absolute value of the unexpected distance. The unexpected distance is computed with the Fast Walsh Transform (FWT) [13]. It can be perceived from Table 7 that the action of symmetric group S_4 on S-box (1) does not affects the average value of nonlinearity.

Table 7

Boolean mappings	Results of nonlinearity								Average
	f_7	f_6	f_5	f_4	f_3	f_2	f_1	f_0	
Small 8×8 S-box	4	4	0	4	2	4	4	4	3.25
$8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box	4	4	0	4	4	4	4	2	3.25

4.3 Linear approximation probability test

The maximum imbalance of an event between input and output bits is quantified by the linear approximation probability test. The linear approximation probability (or the probability of bias) of an S-box $S: GF(2^m) \rightarrow GF(2^n)$ is denoted and defined as:

$$LP_S = \max_{\Gamma x, \Gamma y \neq 0} \left| \frac{\#\{x \in GF(2^m) : x \cdot \Gamma x = f(x) \cdot \Gamma y\}}{2^m} - \frac{1}{2} \right|, \quad (8)$$

where Γx and Γy are the bit-masks to the parity of the input and output bits respectively and ‘.’ denotes the ‘bitwise and’ operation [11]. The proposed small 8×8 S-box exhibits LP with a value of 0.125, which is the maximum linear probability of the 8-bit S-box. Whereas, for $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box the value of LP is zero.

4.4 Differential approximation probability test

Differential cryptanalysis is based on the use of imbalances in the input/output XOR distribution. Differential approximation probability measures the differential uniformity demonstrated by an S-box. The S-box is immune to the differential attack if each output XOR occurs with an equal probability for each input XOR. The differential approximation probability of an S-box $S: GF(2^m) \rightarrow GF(2^n)$ is denoted and defined as :

$$DP_S = \max_{\Delta x \neq 0, \Delta y} \left(\frac{\#\{x \in GF(2^m) | S(x) \oplus S(x \oplus \Delta x) = \Delta y\}}{2^m} \right) \quad (9)$$

where, $\Delta x \in GF(2^m)$ and $\Delta y \in GF(2^n)$ are differentials at the input and output respectively [3]. The smaller the differential uniformity, the stronger is the S-box. The outcomes of the differential approximation probability of the most probable output XOR for $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box by applying the input and output differentials are

given in Table 8. The maximum of the matrix is **0.25**, showing that $DP(8 \times 8 S_4 S\text{-box} = 0.25)$, which coincides the optimal differential bound of 4×4 S-boxes and of small 8×8 S-box.

Table 8

DP of the most probable output XOR for $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box			
0	1	2	3
0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
0.25	0.25	0.25	---

4.5 Strict avalanche criterion

The strict avalanche criterion, introduced by Webster and Tavares in [20], is a generalization of the avalanche effect and it was built on the concepts of completeness and avalanche. The effect of a single input bit change on the output bits is examined by this criterion. A Boolean function $f_n: GF(2^n) \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ is said to fulfill this criterion if, whenever a single input bit is complemented, each of the output bits changes with a **50%** probability. Mathematically,

$$\sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} f_n(v_i) \oplus f_n(v_i \oplus \alpha) = 2^{n-1} \quad (10)$$

Where $\alpha \in GF(2^n)$ such that $HW(\alpha) = 1$. Table 9 shows that the value of average strict avalanche criterion remains analogous after the action. The average value is 0.4688, which is much closed to the ideal value 0.5.

Table 9

Results of Strict avalanche criterion									
Boolean mappings	f_7	f_6	f_5	f_4	f_3	f_2	f_1	f_0	Average
Small 8×8 S-box	0.5	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.75	0.4688
$8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box	0.5	0.5	0	0.5	0.75	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4688

4.6 Majority logic criterion

The objective of this section is to examine the results of correlation analysis, entropy analysis, contrast analysis, homogeneity analysis, energy analysis and mean of absolute deviation (MAD) analysis and decide by using majority logic criterion, the best S-box candidate. Majority logic criterion is stated as: Let there are n S-boxes and I_1, I_2, \dots, I_n be the encrypted images using S-boxes S_1, S_2, \dots, S_n respectively, then S-box S_j is considered better than S_k for $j = \{1, 2, \dots, n\}$ and $k \in \{1, 2, \dots, n\} \setminus \{j\}$ if

- Amount of correlation, homogeneity and energy for I_j is smaller than that of I_k .
- Amount of entropy, contrast and MAD for I_j is greater than that of I_k . [14]

The process of encryption includes byte sub step. The leftmost two LSB's of the input pixel of the plain image are used as row index whereas the rightmost two LSB's are used as column index to select an 8-bit S-box value. LSB's of the S-box value are taken as MSB's of the output pixel and MSB's of the input pixel are taken as LSB's of the output pixel. In this way, all the pixels are substituted to encrypt the whole image. In the decryption operation, the leftmost two MSB's of the input pixel of the encrypted image are used as row index and the rightmost two MSB's are used as column index to select an 8-bit value from the corresponding inverse S-box. LSB's of the S-box value are taken as LSB's of the output pixel and LSB's of the input pixel are taken as MSB's of the output pixel.

Figure 1(a) depicts the standard grayscale image of Lena(.png), of size 512×512 pixels, (b) - (e) are the encrypted images using AES S-box, S_8 AES, small 8×8 S-box and $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box respectively. The visual analysis is revealing that the $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box is very competent in hiding the image contents. The numerical results of statistical analyses used by the majority logic criterion are listed in Table 10. It is observed from the results of statistical analyses that the $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box improves the results for MLC. In figure 2, the encryption quality has been shown by means of histograms of plain image and the encrypted images. Observations from Table 10:

Correlation of: AES S-box < $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box < Small 8×8 S-box < S_8 AES S-box

Homogeneity of: Small 8×8 S-box < $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box < AES S-box < S_8 AES S-box

Energy of: Small 8×8 S-box < $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box < AES S-box < S_8 AES S-box
And,

Entropy of: AES S-box = $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box = Small 8×8 S-box = S_8 AES S-box

Contrast of: AES S-box > $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box > Small 8×8 S-box > S_8 AES S-box

MAD of: AES S-box > $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box > S_8 AES S-box > Small 8×8 S-box




Fig. 1. (a) Plain image, (b) Encrypted image using AES S-box, (c) Encrypted image using S_8 AES S-box, (d) Encrypted image using small 8×8 S-box, (e) Encrypted image using $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box




Fig. 2. Histograms (a) Plain image, (b) Encrypted image using AES S-box, (c) Encrypted image using S_8 AES S-box, (d) Encrypted image using small 8×8 S-box, (e) Encrypted image using $8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box.

Table 10

Results of statistical analyses used by the majority logic criterion

Analyses	Plain image	AES S-box	S_8 AES S-box	Small 8×8 S-box	$8 \times 8 S_4$ S-box
Entropy	7.4451	7.4451	7.4451	7.4451	7.4451
Contrast	0.2288	10.5914	9.2531	10.3525	10.5013
Correlation	0.9503	0.0666	0.1216	0.0175	0.0117
Energy	0.1318	0.0172	0.0174	0.0160	0.0161
Homogeneity	0.9058	0.4352	0.4452	0.4054	0.4070
MAD	19.8828	33.9488	32.0243	31.9990	32.1252

5. Conclusions

In literature, the idea of generation of new S-boxes by the action of symmetric group of permutations S_8 on the elements of 8×8 S-boxes has been practiced by the researchers. But when this idea is applied on the constructions over algebraic substructure, we come across with some issues and found that some of the attained S-boxes are not functional in encryption applications. In this work, we have resolved this problem by performing the action of symmetric group of permutations S_4 and obtained S-boxes with reasonable complexity and confusion creating capability.

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